Resistance to THAAD not in Beijing’s national Interest

China is turning up the heat on economic pressure targeted
at South Korean firms to express its displeasure at the installation of the US-South
Korean missile defense system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense). But this opposition is also likely to be detrimental to Chinese
national interests, according to Shin Kak Soo, former First Vice Minister for
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and current director of the Institute of
Foreign Affairs and National Security’s (IFANS) Center for International Law.
Daily NK recently sat down for an interview with Director Shin (pictured left).

 

Daily NK (DNK): Did you anticipate this level of opposition from the Chinese
on the THAAD installation?  

Shin Kak Soo (SKS): I expected that China would retaliate in some form because
China has continually opposed the system. I knew that this opposition would
materialize at some point. China is particularly concerned with losing face, so
it would be impossible for Beijing to simply let it go and move on. However,
the severity of the retaliation is harsher than I expected. This is likely
related to the fact that Chinese President Xi Jinping vocally opposed THAAD on
three or four occasions.    

 

For China, THAAD is a ‘test case’ that has implications for
the twenty or so countries that populate its local neighborhood. The expression
goes, “Kill the chicken to teach the monkey.” China wants to be in control of
relationships with countries in Southeast Asia and Middle Asia, and wants to
establish a precedent by warning and punishing countries that fall out of line.
THAAD constitutes a significant problem in China’s eyes, so Beijing is meting
out retaliation in proportion to what it perceives is the severity of the
problem.   

 

DNK: Do you think that THAAD represents the kind of direct
security threat to China that Beijing alleges it does?

 

SKS: I don’t think so. And I think that Chinese experts also
believe that the missile defense system doesn’t pose much of a threat to their
security interests. THAAD is a defensive weapon, and it doesn’t have
implications for China’s tactical nuclear capabilities. China’s strategic
nuclear weapons act as a deterrent by guaranteeing mutually assured destruction
(MAD) against countries like Russia and America. THAAD uses hit-to-kill
technology to physically collide with and stop incoming missiles. The system is
expressly built to deal with missile threats from North Korea. It has no impact
on China’s nuclear deterrent.   

 

DNK: China insists that THAAD’s X-band radar will enable the US
and South Korea to detect and track Chinese military installations.

 

SKS: THAAD batteries have 6 launching tubes for a total of 48
missiles. So, if North Korea launches a large volley of missiles at once, it
may be possible to defeat THAAD. For this reason, THAAD’s radars will need to
be trained on North Korea at all times. There is little room for error.

 

THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 land radar, also known as the X-band radar,
has two modes, with different detection ranges. The long distance mode can
detect objects at 2,000 km. But the THAAD being installed in South Korea will
be set to the interception mode, with a range of about 600 km. The angle of
detection is limited to 90 degrees, which means that the radar will be fixed on
North Korea and will not reach into China.  

 

If South Korea was really intent on learning information
about Chinese military installations and movements, this radar is not very
helpful. South Korea already has the Israeli-made Green Pine radar for some
time. This radar would yield better results that the THAAD radar. But when this
system was installed, China did not offer up any resistance. Russia also has
radar capable of seeing into China, and Beijing did not protest against that
installation either. So it is interesting to understand why Beijing has such a
hard time accepting THAAD.

 

DNK: That being the case, what is China’s intention here?

 

SKS: I believe it is related to general opposition against Korea,
Japan, and America expanding their military cooperation. South Korea has
refrained from entering into ballistic missile defense systems with Japan and
America, but installing THAAD would put Korea on that track.

 

When we look at the nature of Chinese decision making, it is
hard for Beijing to change course on a policy line once it makes a public
statement. So it would be difficult for it to roll back resistance on THAAD
now. It’s just the nature of China’s political system. Xi Jinping and the
country as a whole would perceive it as a loss of face to change course.

 

DNK: Will it be possible for China to withdraw opposition to
THAAD?

 

SKS: Not explicitly. However, in the case that China comes to
believe that, no matter how much opposition they put forward, the installation
is inevitable, they might judge that its relationship with Korea is more
important and decide to discretely accept THAAD. They might do so by stopping
economic pressure being applied to South Korean firms, and then pursuing
normalization of ties with Seoul.  

 

DNK: Is China’s THAAD opposition actually in their national
interest?

 

SKS: It’s counter-productive. First of all, Beijing will not get
what it wants: withdrawal of the THAAD installation. Even if a new South Korean
government comes in and decides to review it, the odds are strongly in favor of
installation. Relations between the two countries have plummeted because of
Beijing’s THAAD opposition. Feelings are deteriorating in both countries. Since
rising to power three years ago, Xi Jinping has devoted lots of time and energy
into the bilateral relationship with South Korea. Seeing that go up in smoke would
be a loss for China.  

 

Furthermore, among the world’s most powerful nations, China
is the most dependent on trade. Despite this, Beijing is using trade as a
weapon of retaliation. This might have a boomerang effect, and come back to
bite them. China claims that it is a free trade country, but this latest
episode reveals that there are distinct limitations to that.  

 

In addition, China is emphasizing its role as a diplomatic
heavyweight on the global stage, but this kind of blackmail does no favors for
their reputation. Countries in the region might not trust China on its word
when it says that it prefers to resolve problems through diplomacy. As a world
power, China will lose credibility when it resorts to heavy handed tactics and
then fails to achieve its goal. For South Korea, the important thing is to
patiently and calmly respond, and avoid letting the issue separate and divide
us.

 

DNK: How do you evaluate our government’s response to this
development?

 

SKS: Of course, we can’t really say that our government’s
response has been totally sufficient. When the THAAD issue first because a
problem in Korea, Seoul announced the “3 No’s Principle,” meaning: no decision
has been made, there has been no consultation with America, and there has been
no request to deploy from America. I personally think that this policy was not
a helpful one.

 

DNK: You think that Seoul’s inability to respond resolutely and
without ambiguity caused the problem to become bigger than it needed to be?

 

SKS: THAAD’s installation was an inevitable decision made to
protect US Armed Forces in Korea against North Korea’s growing nuclear threat.
If the decision making and installation process went faster, it would have been
easier to persuade the Chinese. For three out of four years, the Park Geun-hye
presidency had very good relations with China. It was also on communicative
terms with China. During that time, China should have been persuaded in terms
of THAAD’s necessity. But because of the 3 No’s, things got even more
complicated.

 

Even after North Korea’s fourth nuclear test last year,
China remained uncooperative. At that time, South Korea began to discuss the
THAAD installation, but the discussions were far from smooth. For example,
Prime Minister Hwang Kyo Ahn visited China in June of that year. Even though
America and South Korea were preparing to announce the decision to install
THAAD just a few days later, Hwang did not bring that up in his meeting with
the Chinese. A week after that, China was defeated in an arbitration ruling
related to its positions on territory in the South China Sea. Beijing could
view this timing as an affront.

 

DNK: If the decision to install THAAD was announced earlier, do
you think China’s opposition would be less significant?

 

SKS: Of course, they would have opposed it, but I believe the
South Korea-China relationship would be a little better than it currently is.
It is easy to directly witness the impact of economic or other domestic
policies, but diplomacy is different. Sometimes, it’s impossible to measure or
judge the impact of a diplomatic strategy. Diplomatic relations get better or
worse depending on a complex array of factors that pile up on top of one
another. The same is true when it comes to THAAD. There were a lot of diverse
elements that came into play.

 

DNK: Some are also concerned that the deteriorating relationship
with China also means a lost opportunity to work together on North Korea
policy.

 

SKS: There is that possibility. Much depends on how China
implements UN Security Council Resolutions. If China actually becomes upset and
agitated over the THAAD installation, it is America and South Korea’s job to
prevent this. The Trump administration is emphasizing China’s role in
denuclearizing North Korea. This is an effort to get China to responsibly
implement UN resolutions.   

 

If China is hoping to use the THAAD issue as leverage, they
are risking their overall relationship with the US. The US recently fined the
large Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE $1.1 billion for breach of North
Korea sanctions. That fine was 26 times larger than the company’s annual
profits. It is an indicator that Trump will use strong measures on the road
ahead to get China to cooperate on denuclearization.  

 

DNK: South Korea could be negatively impacted by a US-China power
struggle. Considering this, how should Seoul plan for an appropriate diplomatic
and security strategy?

 

SKS: The Republic of Korea should fundamentally consider its own
interests in formulating strategy. The largest threat to South Korea right now
is North Korea’s nuclear and missile cabilities, coupled with the instability
of the Kim regime. After that, the biggest problem is China’s diplomatic and
security policy. China can bully South Korea on issues like THAAD.  

 

South Korea’s most valuable asset is its alliance with the
US. It has to continue to get stronger. With the US’s new administration in
place, its Asia policies are set to change. To prevent the policies from going
in an unfavorable direction, it will be important to strengthen the alliance.
So, it’s important to resolve any problems that might arise between America and
Korea as quickly as possible. South Korea should set a diplomatic strategy to
solve the North Korean nuclear problem through cooperation with America.  

 

After establishing firm ties with the Americans to cement
the alliance, it will be time to turn to neighboring countries like China, Japan,
and Russia to seek out cooperation. But it will also be important to avoid
over-reliance on neighboring countries. That means going out to strengthen ties
with Southeast Asia, EU countries, and the UN to build up diplomatic capital.
Then it will be time to spend that capital on neighboring countries.   

DNK: You emphasized the American alliance. The Trump
administration is looking like it will take a hawkish position on North Korea.
How much does this approach synergize with the approach that South Korea will
need to take?

 

SKS: First of all, secondary sanctions will be necessary to
induce China to get involved in denuclearization efforts in a meaningful way.
We have continued to tighten and strengthen sanctions on North Korea to solve
the nuclear problem, but nothing has been properly executed. UN Security
Council Resolution 2321 is not strong enough. The US congress is becoming
tougher and tougher on the issue. The Trump administration’s position is that
China must become more actively involved in pursuing a solution. Because of
this, I think secondary sanctions are likely to come into action.

 

South Korea must prevent a preemptive strike from happening.
That would lead to a full scale war. Of course, even if this happens, I don’t
think that the South would lose. However, Seoul and the surrounding regions
would see tremendous losses of human life. All the progress that has been made
over the last 50 years through blood and sweat would be lost in an instant. A
preemptive strike is not a realistic option. America also agrees with this
assessment.  

 

I don’t think that relocating tactical nuclear weapons to
South Korea right now would be the best plan.  However, if North Korea
does not stop its nuclear development and becomes a real nuclear power, that
option might become more sensible.