One of the most notable aspects about the
joint statement issued by South and North Korea is that Pyongyang expressed
regret over the land mine incident that maimed two South Korean soldiers. Itβs
not unprecedented, but itβs certainly not common for the North to do so. Today we sat down with our reporters Choi Song Min and Kang
Mi Jin, who both are from North Korea, to get some more insight about the
matter.
My first question goes to Choi Song Min. Pyongyang has failed to
apologize for its many previous provocations in the past. Why do you think it
took such a different path this time?
CHOI: Itβs because the loudspeaker
propaganda broadcasts on the border can do much more harm to Kim Jong Unβs
leadership than any other weapons of mass destruction. Just as Kim Jong Il said, βYou
may not be able to gain surrender with bullets and shells, but propaganda
broadcasts can change the hearts of ten million.β He himself knows just how
powerful broadcasts can be. Itβs because it exposes the many atrocities
committed over the three-generation leadership, and it could lead to discontent
and resistance against the current leader.
In expressing its regret, Pyongyang
specifically referred to itself as βthe Northβ. By doing so, it in some ways
claimed responsibility — completely different from the many times in the past
when it denied its involvement. How are we to interpret this action?
KANG: Thatβs right. Just until a few days
ago, the North was out with its ambassador to the UN, its General
Reconnaissance Bureau chief Kim Yong Chol, and its diplomats all over the world
to publicly deny its involvement in the land mine incident that occurred on the
southern side of the demilitarized zone. Having been so stubborn about this
matter but then going along to express its regret over it and admitting to it
is akin to bowing in front of the world.
What I think is more interesting is not the
use of the word βthe Northβ but the word βregretβ, which even to the smallest extent
expresses its acknowledgement of wrongdoing. As mentioned earlier, in the past,
North Korea has always denied its involvement, so for it to express regret
shows just how desperate it was to get those loudspeakers to stop, as they
could play a role in changing peopleβs perceptions.
The joint statement was also made public to
people in the North through state-run media. What do you think people there are
making of this?
CHOI: Based on the fact that the Northβs
media reported on the joint statement very quickly, itβs very likely it has
branded this whole incident as one of βKim Jong Unβs great achievementsβ and a
βgrand victory in a fight against the Southβ. It will play it up through public
lectures and broadcast propaganda and paint it as a victory ahead of the 70th
anniversary of the Party Foundation. Casting aside its regret over the land
mine victory, it will promote the fact that the South halted propaganda
broadcasts and agreed to hold reunions for separated families. But, North
Koreans all know the typical methods used by Pyongyang, so they will have a
bitter smile for themselves.
We can also note that the North agreed to
stand down from its quasi-state of war.
KANG: People in the North struggle to get
by even under normal conditions. So if they have to be in a quasi-state of war,
it deals a severe blow to their livelihoods. This is why regardless of who came
out the true winner or loser from this situation, people will be happy that
things have returned to normal, and they can go about their livelihoods.
Also, most regions in the North are going
through fall harvest. Especially in Hwanghae Province, which was no exception to the quasi-state of war order, itβs important that they secure their crops, because
it makes up for a significant portion of the Northβs harvest. If they miss the
perfect window for harvest, they could incur massive losses. Given this all,
the North standing down from its quasi-state of war would be the condition for
people to return to their regular lives and carry out a proper harvest.
Despite the upcoming autumn harvest, if the
two sides had not managed to produce an agreement, it would have been a loss
for Pyongyang as well. So it likely would have wanted to lift its quasi-state
of war through the joint agreement as well. It had issued the order as a means
to get the South to halt its loudspeaker operation, so it would have wanted
this demand to be part of the agreement so it can allow people in Hwanghae
Province to resume their normal fall harvest.
Most North Koreans seemed to be unfazed
about the quasi-state of war. Apart from the front line, I heard other parts
didnβt even carry out drills. Given these circumstances, what do you think
people will think of the order suddenly being lifted?
CHOI: People were already expecting the
order to come. Since the Kim Shin Jo incident in 1968, people have seen this
order being issued eight times, so most assumed things would go back to normal
without much happening.
Some people were even commenting on the
fact that they only issued the order in the frontline areas saying, βWhat are we to
make of this? I guess they only are only going to war in Hwanghae Province?β
and they poked fun of it. Having threatened the South as if it were going to
attack it any time soon and then withdrawing the state of war within the next
few days probably drew out a lot of criticism from people saying the country is
just like a βpaper tiger.β
If we look at how things played out, Kim
Jong Un drove things to the brink, then extended an offer for talks and finally
reached an agreement with the South. Itβs almost as if he doesnβt know which
end to pursue, going back and forth between two extremes. What assessment do
you think we can make about Kim Jong Unβs character and qualities?
KANG: Seoul seems to take this as North
Koreaβs typical way of going back and forth on things, or as part of a βpeace
and warβ strategy, but the state portrays this as being βthe Generalβs
strategic play, moving in accordance to the political climate at handβ or they
praise Kim Jong Un, calling this move βunpredictable wisdomβ from the leader.
But with this recent incident, people will
have learned how lacking he is of political skills and leadership and will
see him as a young leader who plays things by ear. Kim Jong Un needs to
understand that his way of doing things comes from decades of commonplace
practices by the North that are outdated, and he should look for a novel and
rational method to strive for unification and world peace.
Also, Pyongyang up until now has stirred up
tensions between the two Koreas and then asked for the South to resolve its
issues. In this sense, Kim Jong Un differs no more from Kim Jong Il. Whatβs
different this time is that Seoul did not kowtow to Pyongyangβs demands and
instead asked for a sincere apology and for the North to stop provocations.
This is why the North in the end surrendered to its demands. To Kim Jong Un,
who struggles to make quick decisions in the face of rapid changes, propaganda
broadcasts are scarier than nuclear weapons. Since this is what Kim Jong Un
truly fears, it will be interesting to see whether this leadership will in the
future take on a different approach when it comes to criticizing the South.
The North has not hesitated once in
slamming the South and lashing out. But it looks like itβs suddenly interested
in creating a mood of reconciliation. What do you think people in the North
will think of this abrupt change in policy and lack of consistency?
CHOI: Recently, Pyongyangβs state-run media
interestingly referred to the South as the Republic of Korea — its globally
recognized formal name. This is extremely unprecedented given that it usually
calls it a scarecrow or puppet country. But it had no choice really. Two of its
most high-level officials were sitting at the negotiating table, so they canβt
very well say theyβre dealing with a puppet regime. Also, they were out to halt these cross-border broadcasts so they probably wanted to
show that they use official names instead of criticizing the South.
But this didn’t last long–before the end of the day the North was already referring to the South as ‘puppets’ again. It just proves the inconsistency and the capricious nature
of the state. People in the North are probably embarrassed by the leadership
and its irrational actions.
So far, the North has not managed to uphold
a single promise it has made to its people. Kim Il Sungβs promise to feed
people βwhite rice and meat brothβ has still not been realized decades later.
The promise to make the country a βstrong and prosperous stateβ by 2012 is
another more recent example that has proven to be a lie. People donβt buy these
lies anymore. They have come to believe the only way to make it is by doing
things their own way to get out of hardships. The one belief carried by all North Koreans is that despite what the state says, the only thing they can really trust is
themselves.
